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1. Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in THE FORGING OF
AMERICAN FEDERALISM: SELECTED WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 337 (Saul K. Padover ed.,
Harper & Row 1953). 
2. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2006).
3. Id.
4. 501 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2007).
5. Jesse Trentadue filed a FOIA request to receive a response that Glen Fine, the
Department of Justice Inspector General, wrote to the Integrity Committee.  Id. at 1224.  The
district court denied Trentadue’s request on the basis that most of Fine’s response was protected
from disclosure by the FOIA’s Fifth Exemption.  Id. at 1225.  On appeal, the Tenth Circuit took
a narrow view of Exemption Five and ordered the Integrity Committee to turn over most of
Fine’s response to Trentadue.  Id. at 1229-31.  
6. Id. at 1225 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5), (7)). 
7. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b).
8. Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 617 F.2d 854 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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Trentadue v. Integrity Committee: An Attempt to Reign in
the Expansion of the Freedom of Information Act’s 5th
Exemption  
A popular Government, without popular information, or the means
of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or,
perhaps both.  Knowledge will forever govern ignorance; And a
people who mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves
with the power which knowledge gives.1
I. Introduction
The Oklahoma City bombing, an alleged suicide, a battered and beaten
corpse, and a grieving brother’s search for the truth.  It sounds more like a
novel than the background of a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)2 court
battle.  But, for the family of Kenneth Trentadue, the FOIA3 and the recent
Tenth Circuit decision in Trentadue v. Integrity Committee4 may be the only
hope to shed some truth on the circumstances surrounding his suspicious
death.  Kenneth Trentadue died under mysterious circumstances while in
federal custody and his brother, Jesse Trentadue, filed a FOIA request to gain
access to certain documents produced during the government’s investigation.5
The district court initially denied Trentadue’s request and found that the
documents could be withheld under FOIA Exemptions Five and Seven.6
Exemption Seven protects information “compiled for law enforcement
purposes,”7 while Exemption Five allows agencies to withhold information
“which would not be available by law to a private party in litigation with the
agency.”8  The deliberative process privilege of Exemption Five protects an
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9. Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Air Force, 566 F.2d 242, 254 (D.C. Cir.
1977).
10. Trentadue, 501 F.3d at 1231-32.
11. Herrick v. Garvey, 298 F.3d 1184 (10th Cir. 2002). 
12. Thomas Blanton, The World’s Right to Know, FOREIGN POL’Y, July-Aug. 2002, at 50.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 50-52.
15. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT GUIDE 5-6 (2007), available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/foia_guide07.htm.
16. 410 U.S. 73, 80 (1973).
agency’s advice and opinions, but not the underlying facts.9  The Tenth Circuit
reversed, holding that most of the previously withheld information was factual
in nature and therefore disclosable.10
The FOIA allows members of the public to access federal agency records.11
The United States FOIA is the most frequently requested access law in the
world.12  In the year 2000, people in the U.S. made more than two million
FOIA requests, and the federal government spent about one dollar per U.S.
citizen ($253 million) administering the law.13  However, administration of the
FOIA presents certain problems as the government tries to weigh its interest
in efficiency and privacy against the citizen’s right to be free from secret law.14
The Department of Justice, in its guide to the FOIA, points to tensions between
the competing interests of secrecy and disclosure and finds that “their
resolution lies in providing a workable scheme that encompasses, balances,
and appropriately protects all interests—while placing primary emphasis on
the most responsible disclosure possible.”15
This note addresses the Tenth Circuit’s opinion in Trentadue v. Integrity
Committee and its positive step in favor of disclosure under the FOIA by
rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s functional test and embracing the United States
Supreme Court’s holding in EPA v. Mink.16  Part II of this note explores the
history of the FOIA and the basic concepts underlying Exemption Five.  Part
III explores the law before Trentadue, including the deliberative process
privilege exemption and its implications for Exemption Five of the FOIA.  Part
IV introduces the circumstances surrounding Kenneth Trentadue’s death and
analyzes the Tenth Circuit’s return to a more narrow interpretation of
Exemption Five.  Part V argues that the Trentadue court reached the correct
decision by narrowing the scope of the deliberative process privilege because
its decision more accurately reflects the rationale and goal of the FOIA.  Part
V also examines the consequences of the Tenth Circuit’s holding and the
potential for increased FOIA litigation under Exemption Five.  This note
concludes in Part VI. 
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17. Herrick v. Garvey, 298 F.3d 1184, 1189 (10th Cir. 2002). 
18. Anderson v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 907 F.2d 936, 941 (10th Cir. 1990)
(quoting NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978)). 
19. Irons & Sears v. Dann, 606 F.2d 1215, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 1979); see also Coastal States
Gas Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 862 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (“The clear purpose of the
FOIA is to assure that the public has access to all government documents, subject to only nine
specific limitations, to be narrowly interpreted, which Congress decided were necessary to
protect our national interests and permit the efficient operation of the government.”). 
20. Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Train, 491 F.2d 63, 66 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
21. H.R. REP. NO. 89-1497, at 3 (1966), as reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2418, 2423.
22. EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80 (1973). 
23. Alirez v. NLRB, 676 F.2d 423, 425 (10th Cir. 1982). 
24. NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 136 (1975). 
25. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2006).  The exemptions to the FOIA are set out in section (b)(1)-(9):
XX(1)(A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order
to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are
in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order; 
XX(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency; 
XX(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b
of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld
from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or (B)
II. The Freedom of Information Act
A. General History and Purpose of the FOIA
The FOIA allows members of the public to access federal agency records.17
The purpose of the FOIA is “to ensure an informed citizenry, vital to the
functioning of a democratic society, needed to check against corruption and
to hold the governors accountable to the governed.”18 Congress created the
FOIA with a strong tendency toward disclosure.19  Nevertheless, the legislature
feared total disclosure and therefore reasoned that “something less than 100%
disclosure of all government operations was only practical and reasonable.”20
When Congress passed the FOIA it emphasized that “[i]t is vital to our way of
life to reach a workable balance between the right of the public to know and
the need of the Government to keep information in confidence to the extent
necessary without permitting indiscriminate secrecy.”21  Thus, the courts have
long interpreted the Act to be “broadly conceived.”22  The FOIA should be
“broadly construed in favor of disclosure” and information in possession of
federal agencies should be disclosed unless they fall within one of the statutory
exemptions.23
Under the FOIA’s structure, “virtually every document generated by an
agency is available to the public in one form or another, unless it [is
exempt].”24  The FOIA lists nine exemptions that Congress included to help
protect important governmental interests that require nondisclosure.25  All
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establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of
matters to be withheld; 
XX(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a
person and privileged or confidential; 
XX(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be
available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;
XX(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; 
XX(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only
to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information
(A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B)
would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C)
could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential
source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private
institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of
a record or information compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the
course of a criminal investigation or by an agency conducting a lawful national
security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source,
(E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations
or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations
or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk
circumvention of the law, or (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life
or physical safety of any individual; 
XX(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports
prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the
regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or
XX(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps,
concerning wells.
Id. § 552(b)(1-9). 
26. U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. 136, 150 (1989). 
27. FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 616 (1982). 
28. Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. at 151; see also NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S.
214, 221 (1978); Dep’t of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976); FAA Adm’r v.
Robertson, 422 U.S. 255, 262 (1975).
29. Alirez v. NLRB, 676 F.2d 423, 425 (10th Cir. 1982). 
30. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b). 
exemptions are clearly defined26 and narrow in scope in order to further the
FOIA’s goal of disclosure.27  Most importantly, the exemptions are explicitly
exclusive and any document that does not fall within one of the nine
exemptions must be disclosed promptly.28  When applying the exemptions,
courts must narrowly circumscribe the exemption in favor of disclosure.29  The
FOIA additionally requires that “[a]ny reasonably segregable portion of a
record shall be provided to any person requesting such record after deletion of
the portions which are exempt.”30  Documents must be analyzed carefully in
order to separate exempt information from non-exempt, disclosable
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31. Id. 
32. Id. 
33. Casad v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 301 F.3d 1247, 1251 (10th Cir. 2002).
34. Id. 
35. Mead Data Cent., Inc., v. U.S. Dep’t of the Air Force, 566 F.2d 242, 250 (D.C. Cir.
1977); see also Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 824-25 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
36. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5). 
37. NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 149 (1975) (“[I]t is reasonable to
construe Exemption 5 to exempt those documents, and only those documents, normally
privileged in the civil discovery context.”); see also Sterling Drug v. FTC, 450 F.2d 698, 704
(D.C. Cir. 1971).  The deliberative process privilege protects an agency’s decision making
process by exempting from disclosure documents that are predecisional and deliberative.
Mapother v. Dep’t of Justice, 3 F.3d 1533, 1537 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
38. The author derived these results by combining statistics from several governmental
reports.  See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, ANNUAL FOIA REPORT FY 2007, at 11-13 (2007),
information.31  Any information not falling within one of the nine exemptions
must be separated and disclosed.32
Congress reinforced these ex ante protections with a post hoc procedural
shift.  In keeping with the policy of disclosure, any agency sued for failure to
disclose bears the burden of justifying nondisclosure.33  Thus, unlike the
traditional American lawsuit in which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof,
in FOIA suits the defendant must justify its reason for nondisclosure.34
Because of the nature of the dispute and the fact that the plaintiff does not
know the content of the disputed documents, courts have held that it is more
reasonable for the burden to be borne by the agency involved.35  Such
structural protections for FOIA requests reflect Congress’ intent that FOIA
disputes be weighed in favor of disclosure.
B. Exemption Five
Exemption Five encompasses “inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums
or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency
in litigation with the agency.”36  Essentially, any document that a party could
withhold during civil litigation under a common law privilege can be withheld
by the government from a FOIA request.  Courts have held that Exemption
Five can reasonably be read to incorporate all privileges that apply in civil
litigation, including, among others, the attorney-client privilege, the executive
privilege and the deliberative process privilege.37
In the year 2007, 178,756 FOIA requests were made to the Department of
Commerce, Department of Defense, Department of Education, Department of
Energy, Department of Justice, Department of Labor, and Department of State,
and of those requests, the departments invoked Exemption Five 8779 times,
or almost 5% of the time.38  Most litigation under Exemption Five of the FOIA
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available at http://www.osec.doc.gov/omo/FOIA/foiarptFY07dept.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE,
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2007, at 12-13 (2007), available at
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/dfoipo/docs/FY2007report.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., THE
SECRETARY’S ANNUAL FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2007, at 11-12
(2007), available at http://www.ed.gov/about/reports/annual/foia/foiafy07.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF
ENERGY, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT 7-10 (2007), available at http://management.energy.gov/
documents/FOIA-AnnualReport2007.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
ACT ANNUAL REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2007, at 1-3 (2007), available at http://www.usdoj.
gov/oip/annual_report/2007/07foiapg5.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
ACT ANNUAL REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2007 (2007), available at http://www.dol.gov/sol/
foia/2008anrpt.htm; U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT ANNUAL REPORT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2007, at 6-8 (2007), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/100129.pdf.
39. Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 867 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
40. JOHN BUZZARD ET AL., PHIPSONS ON EVIDENCE § 14-04 (13th ed. 1982). 
41. Id. 
42. Bernard Schwartz, Estoppel and Crown Privilege in English Administrative Law, 55
MICH. L. REV. 27, 45 (1956).
43. Id. at 51. 
44. Id. at 52. 
45. Id. at 54. 
46. Id. at 55. 
47. Id. at 51.
centers upon the deliberative process privilege because of the subjective and
document specific nature of the issue.39  Therefore, in order to determine the
scope of Exemption Five, courts first had to determine the boundaries and
limitations of the deliberative process privilege as it occurs in the common
law. 
III. Law Leading up to the Trentadue Case
A. The Deliberative Process Privilege Emerges
Support for the privacy of governmental communications originated in
English common law under the crown privilege.40  The crown privilege
covered such information as parliamentary deliberations and communications
by public officials.41  Specifically, five categories of information could be
withheld including state secrets,42 official information,43 criminal
proceedings,44 civil proceedings with the crown as plaintiff,45 and civil
proceedings with the crown as defendant.46  The crown privilege protected
official information in order to protect the internal functioning of the
government in the same way that Exemption Five now protects the
deliberative process.47
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48. See Wertheim v. Cont’l Ry. & Trust Co., 15 F. 716, 724 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1883); Appeal
of Hartanft, 85 Pa. 433, 447 (1877). 
49. Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 18 (1938). 
50. 157 F. Supp. 939, 946 (Ct. Cl. 1958) (quoting United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409,
422 (1941)). 
51. NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 150 (1975). 
52. Id. (quoting Tennessean Newspapers, Inc. v. FHA, 464 F.2d 657, 660 (6th Cir. 1972)).
53. Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 862 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
54. EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 86 (1973). 
55. Id.
In America, the earliest cases that emerged for the purpose of protecting
information within the government developed an executive privilege that
covered deliberations of the President and other high level officials.48  By the
early twentieth century, the Supreme Court extended the rule protecting the
mental processes of government officials beyond just the President when it
held that “it was not the function of the court to probe the mental processes of
the Secretary [of Agriculture] in reaching his conclusions.”49  Later, Kaiser
Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. United States further developed the
deliberative process privilege when the Court of Claims recognized that “the
integrity of the administrative process must be equally respected” when
considering whether internal government documents must be discoverable.50
Kaiser paved the way for the modern application of the deliberative process
privilege under Exemption Five of the FOIA, which would later encompass
pre-decisional and deliberative inter- and intra-agency documents.  Based upon
the legislative history of the FOIA, the Court, in NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., determined that Congress had the executive privilege in mind when it
adopted Exemption Five.51  Additionally, cases show that the privilege rests
on the “policy of protecting the ‘decision making processes of government
agencies.’”52
B. Two-step Analysis to Determine if a Document Is Exempt From
Disclosure Under the Deliberative Process Privilege
Following the passage of the FOIA in 1966, courts were faced with how to
interpret common law privileges within the context of the FOIA.  Exemption
Five “is cast in terms of discovery law,” and allows government agencies to
withhold documents that “would not be available by law to a private party in
litigation.”53  While the FOIA refers to discovery laws, the Supreme Court has
stated that discovery rules should only be applied to FOIA cases “by way of
rough analogies.”54  The Supreme Court combined the rough analogy of
discovery principles with the narrow construction intended by Congress when
determining the extent of FOIA exemptions.55
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56. Schlefer v. United States, 702 F.2d 233, 237 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
57. Id.  
58. Casad v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 301 F.3d 1247, 1251 (10th Cir. 2002).
59. ALBERTO GONZALES, ATT’Y GEN., IMPROVING AGENCY DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION
(2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/ag_report_to_president_13392.pdf. 
60. Alirez v. NLRB, 676 F.2d 423, 425 (10th Cir. 1982); see also Dep’t of the Air Force
v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361-62 (1976). 
61. Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 866 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
62. Id. at 867. 
63. Fla. House of Representatives v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 961 F.2d 941, 948 (11th Cir.
1992).
64. NLRB v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 153 n.19 (1975).
65. Coastal States, 617 F.2d at 867.
In order to determine the scope of Exemption Five, courts had to balance
the competing interests of disclosure against the need for governmental
secrecy, while embracing the rationale surrounding the creation of the
privilege.  While the FOIA allows public access to documents in order to
prevent the creation of secret law, Congress also intended to protect the
decision making process by keeping it free from damaging scrutiny and by
promoting the free flow of ideas.56  For the deliberative process privilege,
courts recognized the importance of allowing subordinates to make
recommendations to their superiors without fear of public criticism or
ridicule.57  The courts emphasized that “officials will not communicate
candidly among themselves if each remark is a potential item of discovery and
front page news.”58  On the other hand, the FOIA is “a fundamental
cornerstone of our modern democratic system of government,”59 and all
exemptions must be narrowly construed in favor of disclosure.60
As a result of these competing interests, the general rule regarding the
application of the deliberative process privilege under Exemption Five is that
it protects documents that are both pre-decisional and deliberative because
documents fitting those classifications have a greater risk of stifling candid
communication within agencies.61  Whether a document is pre-decisional
revolves around the timeline of when the document was created,62 while the
deliberative element centers on the actual content of the information.63  The
pre-decisional requirement of the deliberative process privilege can usually be
easily determined by an examination of the document itself and the
circumstances surrounding its creation.64  The most difficult part of applying
Exemption Five is classifying a document as deliberative because of the
document-specific nature of the inquiry.65
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66. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. at 153 n.19.
67. Id. 
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. 
71. Id. at 152. 
72. Taxation with Representation Fund v. IRS, 646 F.2d 666, 677 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
73. Id.
74. Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 866 (D.C. Cir. 1980); see
also Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. at 161; Taxation, 646 F.2d at 678.
75. Bristol-Meyers Co. v. FTC, 598 F.2d 18, 24 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
76. Vaughn v. Rosen, 523 F.2d 1136, 1143-44 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
1. Pre-decisional
The Supreme Court in Sears, Roebuck & Co. acknowledged that a bright
line cannot be drawn that easily distinguishes between pre- and post-decisional
documents.66  It set the standard that final opinions are generally post-
decisional because they look back on and explain decisions that have already
been made or policies that have already been adopted by the agency.67  The
disclosure of documents that look back on adopted policies pose little risk of
inhibiting advice within agencies.68  Therefore, they do not create the same risk
as pre-decisional documents.69  Post-decisional opinions will explain decisions
that have been made or provide guidance for how similar problems will be
solved in the future based upon past decisions.  Most importantly, such
documents look back at decisions already made and have a miniscule risk of
inhibiting future advice within agencies.  Conversely, pre-decisional
documents make recommendations and offer opinions on the future course of
the agency.70  If exposure of the document to public scrutiny will likely lead
to a temperance in future recommendations, it is most likely pre-decisional.71
The D.C. Circuit differentiated between pre- and post-decisional documents
by characterizing pre-decisional documents as those that “reflect the agency
‘give-and-take’ leading up to a decision that is characteristic of the deliberative
process . . . .”72  Post-decisional documents are those that explain an agency’s
position on a subject or represent their position on an issue and therefore are
the “working law” of an agency.73  Additionally, according to the D.C. Circuit,
a document can lose its pre-decisional nature if the agency adopts the
document “formally or informally, as the agency position on an issue or is
used by the agency in its dealings with the public.”74  Accordingly, Exemption
Five will not apply to any memorandum that is “adopted or incorporated by
reference in a nonexempt ‘final opinion.’”75
Once a document has been classified as pre-decisional, it must also be
deliberative to be exempt from disclosure.76  Pre-decisional documents must
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2008
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77. Id.
78. Taxation, 646 F.2d at 678; see also Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Air
Force, 566 F.2d 242, 257 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Vaughn, 523 F.2d at 1144. 
79. Coastal States, 617 F.2d at 867. 
80. EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973).
81. Id. at 89. 
82. Coastal States, 617 F.2d at 866. 
83. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 939, 946 (Ct. Cl.
1958).
be part of the “agency give-and-take—of the deliberative process—by which
the decision itself is made” in order to be exempt under Exemption Five.77
2. Deliberative
While documents must be pre-decisional to even trigger the deliberative
process privilege, a document is not exempt from disclosure simply because
it is pre-decisional; it must also be part of the deliberative process.78  The
deliberative aspect of a document remains even harder for courts to define
because “the deliberative process privilege is so dependent upon the individual
document and the role it plays in the administrative process.”79  To further the
confusion, there has been only one Supreme Court opinion interpreting what
qualifies as deliberative.  In EPA v. Mink, the Supreme Court attempted to
create a loose fact or opinion test for determining whether a document is
deliberative.80  Following Mink, some circuits have broadened the application
of this test to expand Exemption Five, but the Supreme Court has yet to
determine whether these broader tests satisfy the legislative intent of the FOIA.
C. Differing Approaches to Determining if Information is Deliberative
1. Fact or Opinion Test Created by EPA v. Mink
The Mink court looked to the history of the common law deliberative
process privilege and the purpose of such privilege, finding that Exemption
Five “requires different treatment for materials reflecting deliberative or
policy-making processes on the one hand, and purely factual, investigative
matters on the other.”81  In doing so, the court devised the fact or opinion test
under which materials reflecting policy-making processes are exempt,
including “recommendations, draft documents, proposals, suggestions, and
other subjective documents which reflect the personal opinions of the writer.”82
The Court looked back to its desire in Kaiser to exempt those documents
“injurious to the consultative functions of government that the privilege of
non-disclosure protects” when creating the fact or opinion test.83  
The Court found a basis for the fact or opinion test by examining the
original language used in the bill that would later become the Freedom of
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol61/iss2/6
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84. Mink, 410 U.S. at 89-90.
85. Id. at 90 (quoting Hearings on S. 1160, S. 1336, S. 1758, S. 1879 Before the Subcomm.
on Admin. Practice and Procedure of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 7 (1965)). 
86. Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 88-1219 (1964)).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 91.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Mead Data Cent., Inc., v. U.S. Dep’t of the Air Force, 566 F.2d 242, 256 (D.C. Cir.
1977). 
92. Wolfe v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 839 F.2d 768, 774 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
93. Mead, 566 F.2d at 256. 
94. Wolfe, 839 F.2d at 774. 
Information Act.84  Originally the language exempted “inter-agency or intra-
agency memorandums or letters dealing solely with matters of law or
policy.”85  Congress modified the language that would later become
Exemption Five in order to permit “[a]ll factual material in Government
records . . . to be made available to the public.”86  The language changed
because the proposed exemption would allow the disclosure of documents with
a mixture of fact and opinions merely because they did not deal “solely with
matters of law or policy.”87  The Court characterized the original language as
putting forth a “wooden” test with little practicality.88
The Mink court aptly stressed the original legislative intent when attempting
to derive a “common-sense” approach to Exemption Five.89  Under Mink, any
facts that are reasonably segregable from the policies and opinions within a
document must be separated and disclosed.90  The D.C. Circuit lauded the
decision, noting that the fact or opinion distinction “offers a quick, clear, and
predictable rule of decision.”91  By analyzing Exemption Five from both a
historical and legislative intent perspective, the fact and opinion test espoused
in Mink seems most in line with the FOIA’s policy of broad disclosure and
narrowly drawn exemptions.
2. A Small Retreat from the Pro-Disclosure Fact or Opinion Test: Not
All Factual Information Must Be Disclosed
Following Mink, several courts took issue with the simplicity of the fact or
opinion test and shifted towards creating a broader exemption.  Some courts
warned they could not “mechanically apply the fact/opinion test”92 and
cautioned that “courts must be careful not to become victims of their own
semantics.”93  Because the exemption seeks to protect the deliberative process
and not just deliberative materials, these courts worried that even factual
material could expose the deliberative process and should therefore be covered
under the exemption.94  For instance, the D.C. Circuit in Montrose Chemical
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95. Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Train, 491 F.2d 63, 71 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
96. Id. 
97. Wolfe, 839 F.2d at 778 (Edwards, J., dissenting) (quoting S. REP. NO. 89-913 (1965)).
98. See, e.g., Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 861 F.2d 1114, 1118 (9th Cir. 1988)
(“When a court must decide whether exemption 5 applies in a complicated case, we believe a
better analytical tool than merely determining whether the material itself was essentially
deliberative or factual should be used: we should focus on whether the document in question
is a part of the deliberative process.”); Wolfe, 839 F.2d at 774 (“In some circumstances, even
material that could be characterized as ‘factual’ would so expose the deliberative process that
it must be covered by the [deliberative process] privilege.”) (citing Mead, 566 F.2d at 256);
Dudman Commc’ns Corp. v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 815 F.2d 1565, 1568 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(“Courts soon came to realize, however, that use of the factual matter/deliberative matter
distinction produced incorrect outcomes in a small number of cases. . . . Courts therefore began
to focus less on the nature of the materials sought and more on the effect of the materials’
release . . . .”); Ryan v. Dep’t of Justice, 617 F.2d 781, 791 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (requiring
disclosure of facts only if they “do not reveal the deliberative process and are not intertwined
with the policymaking process); Montrose Chem., 491 F.2d at 68 (“If the exemption is intended
to protect only deliberative materials, then a factual summary of evidence on the record would
not be exempt from disclosure.  But if the exemption is to be interpreted to protect the agency's
deliberative process, then a factual summary prepared to aid an administrator in resolution of
a difficult, complex question would be within the scope of the exemption.”). 
99. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 861 F.2d at 1114.
100. Id. at 1115. 
found that summaries of purely factual information prepared by an agency for
use in the decision making process would be exempt from disclosure because
merely a summary of facts would expose the deliberative process.95  The
Montrose court did not completely reject the fact or opinion test, but instead
“recognize[d] that in some cases selection of facts or summaries may reflect
a deliberative process which exemption 5 was intended to shelter.”96
Nevertheless, not all jurists agreed with the expansion of the fact or opinion
test, and one dissent warned that such expansion “betokens a dangerous
departure from past Exemption Five law and certainly does not construe the
exception as ‘narrowly as consistent with efficient Government operation.’”97
Unfortunately, courts continued to expand Exemption Five, chipping away at
its effectiveness with the “functional” test.98  This dilution of FOIA protection
is pronounced under the case of National Wildlife Federation v. United States
Forest Service.99
3. A Larger Retreat from the Policy of Disclosure: The Functional Test
of National Wildlife Federation v. U.S. Forest Service
In National Wildlife Federation v. United States Forest Service, the
National Wildlife Federation sought copies of internal documents from the
United States Forest Service through a FOIA request.100  The requested
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101. Id. 
102. Id. 
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1118. 
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1120. 
107. Id. at 1119. 
108. Id. at 1120 (citing Dudman Commc’ns Corp. v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 815 F.2d 1565,
1568 (9th Cir. 1987); Lead Indus. Ass’n, Inc. v. OSHA, 610 F.2d 70, 85-86 (2d Cir. 1979);
Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Train, 491 F.2d 63, 67-68 (D.C. Cir. 1974)).
109. Id. at 1121.
110. Quarles v. Dep’t of the Navy, 893 F.2d 390, 392 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (quoting Dudman,
documents included working drafts of several forest plans, drafts of an
environmental impact statement related to the forest plans, and previews of
drafts containing comments and recommendations made by the Land
Management Office in the District of Columbia.101  The Forest Service denied
the FOIA request under Exemption Five’s deliberative process privilege.102
The United States District Court for the District of Oregon ordered the Forest
Service to release those portions of the documents containing factual materials
that could be segregated from the deliberative materials.103
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit moved away from the fact or opinion
dichotomy—used as a litmus test by many courts—and advocated instead for
a functional test.104  Under the Ninth Circuit’s functional test, a court “should
focus on whether the document in question is a part of the deliberative
process.”105  Because “[d]ecisions of government agencies are not made in a
vacuum,”106 the Ninth Circuit held that “[f]actual materials . . . would likewise
be exempt from disclosure to the extent that they reveal the mental processes
of decisionmakers.”107  The Ninth Circuit pointed to the possibility that the
revelation of mere facts can in some ways reflect the deliberative process
because “[e]ach opinion as to which of the great constellation of facts are
relevant and important and each assessment of the implications of those facts
suggests a different course of action by the agency.”108
The Ninth Circuit then analyzed the requested documents under its new
functional test, finding that the draft forest plans reflected the deliberative
process of the Forest Service and therefore could be withheld under Exemption
Five.109  The functional test required the court to independently assess each
factual document to determine whether or not they exposed the agency’s
deliberative process.  The threshold for exempting factual documents under the
functional test required only that disclosure “would expose an agency’s
decisionmaking process in such a way as to discourage candid discussion
within the agency and thereby undermine the agency’s ability to perform its
functions.”110  By adopting this threshold, the Ninth Circuit took an even
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815 F.2d at 1568); see also Access Reports v. Dep’t of Justice, 926 F.2d 1192, 1195 (D.C. Cir.
1991) (examining whether disclosure of the document would “discourage candid discussion
within the agency”) (quoting Dudman, 815 F.2d at 1567-68); Formaldehyde Inst. v. Dep’t of
Health & Human Servs., 889 F.2d 1118, 1123 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (concluding that the opinion-fact
distinction does not matter so much as the “effect of the materials’ release” on deliberative
process) (quoting Dudman, 815 F.2d at 1568).
111. Estate of Trentadue ex rel. Aguilar v. United States, 397 F.3d 840, 847 (10th Cir. 2005);
see Mary Fischer, A Case of Homicide?, GQ, Sept. 1, 1996, at 262, 264 [hereinafter Fischer,
Homicide]. 
112. Estate of Trentadue, 397 F.3d at 848; see Fischer, Homicide, supra note 111, at 264.
113. Fischer, Homicide, supra note 111, at 263. 
114. Estate of Trentadue, 397 F.3d at 848; see Mary Fischer, Cover-Up in Cell 709, GQ,
Dec. 1, 1997, at 272, 273 [hereinafter Fischer, Cover-Up]. 
115. Fischer, Cover-Up, supra note 114, at 275.
116. Id. at 275. 
117. Id. at 276. 
118. Letter from Fred B. Jordan, M.D., Chief Medical Examiner, to the file of Kenneth
Trentadue (Dec. 20, 1995), available at http://www.motherjones.com/news/featurex/2007/07/
broader approach than previously advocated by other circuits and extended the
scope of Exemption Five to the point that nearly every imaginable document
would be exempt.
IV. Trentadue v. Integrity Committee: A Brother’s Attempt to
Uncover the Truth
A. Factual Background
1. An Unfortunate Death and an Even More Unfortunate Cover-up
Police officers made contact with Kenneth Trentadue for a driving violation
in California.111  They arrested him on a parole violation and eventually
transferred him to the Federal Transfer Center (FTC) in Oklahoma City for his
hearing with the parole board.112  While in protective custody, he made several
calls to his family.  During each phone call he appeared normal, making small
talk and mentioning his new wife and baby.113  Two days after Kenneth arrived
at the FTC and only a few hours after being moved to solitary confinement,
Kenneth’s body was found hanging in his cell.114  A prison official phoned
Kenneth’s mother to inform her that her son had committed suicide and to
offer to cremate the body.115  While shocked by the news, Wilma Trentadue
retained the presence of mind to refuse permission to cremate her son.116  Not
until his battered and bruised body reached the Trentadue family did the full
extent of the violence of Kenneth’s death become evident.117
Kenneth Trentadue’s body bore numerous marks that the medical examiner
said could not have been self-inflicted.118  Jesse Trentadue documented the
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Jordan_12.20.95.pdf [hereinafter Letter from Jordan].
119. Letter from Jesse C. Trentadue to Marie Carter, Acting Warden of the Oklahoma City
Federal Transfer Center (Aug. 30, 1995), available at http://www.motherjones.com/news/
featurex/2007/07/Trentadue_08.30.95.pdf [hereinafter Letter from Trentadue].
120. Estate of Trentadue ex rel. Aguilar v. United States, 397 F.3d 840, 849 (10th Cir. 2005);
see Letter from Trentadue, supra note 119.
121. Letter from Jordan, supra note 118.
122. Letter from Trentadue, supra note 119.
123. James Ridgeway et al., In Search of John Doe No. 2, MOTHER JONES, Summer 2007,
at 54.  After the Oklahoma City bombing, law enforcement searched for a man that witnesses
claimed they saw with Timothy McVeigh and who was seen by some walking away from the
Ryder truck.  Id.  That man became known around the world as John Doe No. 2.  According to
the police, he was 5 foot 9 inches, muscular, and dark-haired.  Id.  John Doe No. 2 was likely
a bank robber named Richard Lee Guthrie.  Id.  Guthrie and his gang, the Aryan Republican
Army (ARA), carried out 22 bank robberies in the Midwest and used their money to support
white supremacist activities.  Id.  It is theorized that federal law enforcement thought that the
ARA was involved in the Oklahoma City bombing and thought that Trentadue was Guthrie.
Id.  Interestingly, the real Guthrie died by hanging in a jail cell shortly before he was due to
testify in court.  Id.  A Chairman’s Report from the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee
of the House International Relations Committee noted that the death of Richard Guthrie
mirrored that of Kenneth Trentadue, who “may have been tangentially and incorrectly linked
to the Oklahoma City bombing.”  DANA ROHRABACHER, THE OKLAHOMA CITY BOMBING: WAS
THERE A FOREIGN CONNECTION? 10 (2006), available at http://rohrabacher.house.gov/
UploadedFiles/Report%20from%20the%20Chairman.pdf.  Additionally, the House Report
stated that “[t]he death of these two prisoners, who happened to be very similar in appearance,
is more than disturbing.”  Id. at 10. 
124. Memorandum from the Board of Inquiry Regarding Death of Inmate Vance Paul
Brockaway 1 (Oct. 2, 1995), available at http://www.motherjones.com/news/featurex/2007/07/
marks on his brother’s body with the precision of a professional medical
examiner—complete with labels and photographs—and included them in a
letter to Marie Carter, the acting warden of the Oklahoma City Federal
Transfer Center.119  Bruises covered Kenneth’s body, both sets of knuckles
were scraped and bruised, there were fingerprint marks under his armpits, there
were restraint marks left by hands on his left wrist, and his throat was
slashed.120  The medical examiner wrote that he “felt Mr. Trentadue had been
abused and tortured.”121  Trentadue’s family wondered how a man in protective
custody, isolated from everyone but prison guards, could come to be in such
a battered state.122
Theories abound as to the actual cause of Kenneth’s injuries and death.
Some speculators have suggested that FBI officials mistook Kenneth for John
Doe No. 2, whom police sought in connection with the Oklahoma City
bombing.123  Regardless of why Kenneth had to struggle for his life, the Office
of Inspector General (OIG) admits that prison officials made many errors in
response to Kenneth’s death.124  Most of these errors revolve around what
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BOP_9.20.95.pdf [hereinafter Memorandum from Board of Inquiry].
125. Estate of Trentadue, 397 F.3d at 848; see Memorandum from Board of Inquiry, supra
note 124, at 4-5. 
126. Estate of Trentadue, 397 F.3d at 849; see Memorandum from Board of Inquiry, supra
note 124, at 6.
127. Estate of Trentadue, 397 F.3d at 849; see Memorandum from Board of Inquiry, supra
note 124, at 5. 
128. Memorandum from Board of Inquiry, supra note 124, at 5.
129. Ridgeway et al., supra note 123. 
130. Fischer, Cover-Up, supra note 114, at 276.
131. Trentadue v. Integrity Comm., 501 F.3d 1215, 1223 (10th Cir. 2007).
132. Id.
133. Id. 
134. Id. 
135. Exec. Order No. 12,993, § 1(a), 61 Fed. Reg. 13,043, 13,043 (Mar. 21, 1996). 
appears to be a concerted effort to cover the truth.  First, the prison workers
who found Kenneth’s body did not immediately cut him down or attempt to
see if he was still alive.125  Second, only a cursory investigation and attempt to
preserve evidence occured and the room was cleaned of all blood and trace
evidence by that afternoon.126  Third, CPR was not administered.127  Fourth, the
prison officials produced fraudulent memos stating that CPR had been
performed when it had not128 and that a second person’s blood was found along
with Kenneth’s in his cell.129  Finally, even more appalling, officials did not
interview witnesses until nearly four months after the incident, and only then
because of the pressure applied by the Trentadue family.130
2. A FOIA Battle to Uncover the Truth
Following Kenneth’s death, several investigations ensued.  Initially, the
Bureau of Prisons looked into the matter, but ceased the inquiry after the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) opened its own criminal inquiry.131
When Trentadue’s family questioned the FBI’s conduct, the Civil Rights
Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) took over the
investigation.132  The DOJ Office of the Inspector General (OIG) determined
that Kenneth Trentadue committed suicide, as did the Oklahoma City Police
Department.133
The Trentadue family refused to believe that Kenneth killed himself.
Consequently, Kenneth’s brother, Jesse, filed an administrative complaint with
the Integrity Committee (IC), a committee of the President’s Council on
Integrity and Efficiency (PCIE), which alleged misconduct by the DOJ
Inspector General (IG) Glen Fine and his staff.134  The IC has the power to
“receive, review, and refer for investigation allegations of wrongdoing against
IGs and certain staff members of the OIGs.”135  The IC determines if any
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137. Id. at 1224. 
138. Id. 
139. Id. 
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143. Id.  
144. Id. 
145. Id. 
146. Id. 
147. Id. 
148. Id.
wrongdoing occurred and can then either investigate the matter itself or refer
it to another governmental agency for further action.136
The DOJ refused to pursue criminal charges; however, the IC did request
that Fine respond to Jesse Trentadue’s allegations.137  Fine complied with the
IC’s request in September 2002.138  Trentadue asked to view Fine’s response,
but the IC refused to release the document.139  On November 26, 2002, the IC
sent Trentadue a letter informing him that the IC would take no further action
regarding his allegations.140  Trentadue claimed he did not receive the letter
and contacted the IC in February 2003 to determine the status of their
investigation.141  The IC resent the November 26 letter specifying that the
investigation was closed.142
After learning the IC had closed its investigation, “Trentadue filed a FOIA
request, seeking: “(1) any IC reports or rulings issued in Case Number 349, (2)
copies of all documents submitted by the DOJ or OIG to the IC, (3) copies of
all documents sent from the IC or PCIE to the DOJ or OIG, and (4) any record
indicating that the IC actually mailed the November 26 letter on November
26.”143  In April 2003, Trentadue filed a complaint against the IC and PCIE in
federal court, although he later dismissed his claim against the PCIE.144  By
this point, the FOIA dispute narrowed to two records: “the set of documents
submitted by Fine to the IC, and an IC scheduling notice.”145  The IC claimed
that the documents could be withheld under FOIA Exemptions 5, 6, 7(A) and
7(C).146
The district court reviewed the record in camera and granted the IC’s
motion for summary judgment as to Fine’s submissions to the IC, but the court
found for Trentadue with respect to the scheduling notice.147  Trentadue then
appealed the district court’s rulings under docket number 04-4200.148  While
his appeal was pending, the IC released two more documents to Trentadue: (1)
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150. Id. at 1225 (citing Trentadue v. Fed. Transfer Ctr., No. 2:03-CV-00946 (D. Utah May
23, 2005)). 
151. Id. (citing Trentadue v. Fed. Transfer Ctr., No. 2:03-CV-00946, slip op. at 2).  In the
federal case, Hillman (Public Integrity Section) submitted a declaration contending that the
release of information would interfere with an ongoing investigation.  Id. (citing Trentadue v.
Fed. Transfer Ctr., No. 2:03-CV-00946, slip op. at 2).  The district court noted a “conflict in
the record as to whether there is in fact an ongoing investigation being conducted by the Public
Integrity Section.”  Id. (quoting Trentadue v. Fed. Transfer Ctr., No. 2:03-CV-00946, slip op.
at 2).  The district court ordered Hillman to appear to testify as to the status of the investigation.
Id. (citing Trentadue v. Fed. Transfer Ctr., No. 2:03-CV-00946, slip op. at 2).  Hillman
submitted a declaration to the court stating that the investigation had been closed.  Id. (citing
Trentadue v. Fed. Transfer Ctr., No. 2:03-CV-00946, slip op. at 2).  The IC then followed a
motion for vacatur and remand because 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A) (2006) would no longer justify
withholding the documents at issue. Id. (citing Trentadue v. Fed. Transfer Ctr., No. 2:03-CV-
00946, slip op. at 2).  The motion was granted and the case was remanded to determine if any
other FOIA exemptions would justify the withholding of the requested documents.  Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. 
154. Id. at 1228 (quoting Wolfe v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 839 F.2d 768, 774
(D.C. Cir. 1988)). 
155. Id.
156. Id. 
a cover letter accompanying a substitute page submitted by Fine to the IC, and
(2) an attachment to Fine’s comments that consisted of a district court order.149
While pursuing his appeal, Trentadue filed a second FOIA case in federal
court.150  After a series of hearings,151 the district court found that Exemption
Five would permit the IC to withhold all of the documents.  Trentadue again
appealed, and the court assigned another docket number: 06-4129.152  The
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals consolidated his two appeals into Trentadue
v. Integrity Committee.153
B. The Tenth Circuit’s Decision: A Step Towards Revitalization of FOIA
The IC argued that, under a functional view of the deliberative process
privilege, factual material should be protected whenever it would “expose the
deliberative process.”154  The Tenth Circuit correctly noted that allowing the
exclusion of any information that disclosed some portion of an agency’s
decision making process would allow Exemption Five to completely swallow
the FOIA.155  Indeed, the court reasoned it could not “imagine a document that
would not divulge some tidbit regarding an agency’s deliberative process.”156
Even more importantly, the Tenth Circuit rejected the IC’s argument in favor
of a functional approach with a reminder that the IC’s overly broad reading
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160. Id. (quoting Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Air Force, 566 F.2d 242, 256
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163. Trentadue, 501 F.3d at 1229.
164. Id. at 1230-31. 
165. Id. 
166. Id. at 1230.
contradicted the court’s duty to construe the FOIA exemptions as narrowly as
possible.157
By returning to a disclosure-centered policy for interpreting Exemption
Five, the Tenth Circuit correctly moved away from the functional test adopted
by the Ninth Circuit.  Like the Eleventh Circuit, the Tenth Circuit held that
“[t]he fact/opinion distinction continues to be an efficient and workable
standard for separating out what is, and what is not, deliberative.”158  Under the
Tenth Circuit’s holding, factual information may only be withheld under
certain narrow circumstances.159  Such information could be exempt from
disclosure only when the information would “so expose the deliberative
process within an agency that it must be deemed exempted.”160
The Tenth Circuit also rejected the functional test—specifically the decision
in National Wildlife Federation—which allowed an agency to withhold facts
if revealing them would reflect the writer’s choice as to which facts to
include.161  The court correctly noted that extending Exemption Five to
encompass nearly all factual information completely contradicted EPA v.
Mink.162
After determining that factual materials are not privileged unless they fit
within the narrow exemption, the Tenth Circuit examined the actual
documents in dispute.163  In doing so, the court overturned the district court’s
decision by finding most of the documents disclosable.164  For most of the
documents requested, the court held that Exemption Five did not protect the
information from disclosure.165 The court went further, dissecting the
documents sentence-by-sentence in order to disclose every possible disclosable
piece of information.166
In a victory for the Trentadue family, the Tenth Circuit ordered large
portions of the letter from Fine to the IC that had previously been withheld to
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167. Id.  The court found that, while some of the letter contained Fine’s opinion and clearly
fell within the exemption, almost all of page two did not reflect Fine’s opinion.  Id.  That
portion of the letter simply states historical facts about the OIG’s investigation of Kenneth’s
death and should be disclosed.  Id.  Additionally, the letter lists the individuals that helped
prepare the OIG’s response to the IC and, again, the court found that this should be disclosed
with only minor portions redacted because they contain Fine’s personal opinions.  Id.
168. Id. 
169. Id.  The court analyzes the document sentence-by-sentence in order to determine which
sections contain factual material that must be disclosed, which contain factual material that
would reveal the deliberative process and which would constitute the writer’s opinions and must
be exempt.  Id. 
170. Id.  The court found Fine’s substantive responses “largely factual, though a small
amount of deliberative material is sprinkled throughout.”  Id.
171. H.R. REP. NO. 89-1497, at 6 (1966) (“It is vital to our way of life to reach a workable
balance between the right of the public to know and the need of the Government to keep
information in confidence to the extent necessary without permitting indiscriminate secrecy.”).
now be disclosed.167  More importantly, the court found that a large portion of
the second document, Fine’s substantive response to the IC, must also be
disclosed to the Trentadue family.168  The court held that the first seven pages
of the response were disclosable because it covered background information
on Kenneth’s death and the investigations that followed.169  Additionally, the
court concluded that most of Fine’s response was similarly disclosable despite
the district court’s finding that the response consisted of exempt opinions.170
The Tenth Circuit’s step-by-step analysis of the disputed documents, down
to the individual sentences, should serve as a guide for courts confronted with
Exemption Five claims.  While such a process may be tedious and time-
consuming, the importance of the FOIA in fighting conspiracies and
corruption supersedes the inconvenience to the government.  For the Trentadue
family, the Tenth Circuit’s diligent examination of the information at issue
could provide the answer to years of searching for the truth behind Kenneth’s
death.
IV. Analysis of the Modified Fact or Opinion Test Adopted
by the Trentadue Court 
A. Courts Must Remain True to the Purpose of the Freedom of Information
Act
Congress clearly recognized the importance of open government when it
passed the Freedom of Information Act.171  The U.S. Supreme Court has noted
that the basic purpose of FOIA is “to ensure an informed citizenry, vital to the
functioning of a democratic society, needed to check against corruption and
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Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary). 
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http://www.cjog.net/documents/CX__FOIA_report_Part_1.pdf.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 2. 
178. OPEN Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-17, 121 Stat. 2524 (to be codified at
5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006)). 
179. Id. 
180. FOIA Makeover Signed into Law by Bush, Giving Greater Access, LONG BEACH PRESS
TELEGRAM, Jan. 1, 2008, at 6A. 
to hold the governors accountable to the governed.”172  Even forty years later,
legislators praise FOIA as “a watershed moment for our democracy” and “an
indispensable tool in protecting the people’s right to know.”173
Despite the professed importance of FOIA and a Presidential Directive
aimed at increasing agency compliance,174 individuals making FOIA requests
are waiting longer to receive information.  As of 2005, FOIA performance was
at its lowest since reporting began in 1998.175  Reports show that, in 2005, 31%
of requests had not been filled by the end of the year—138% higher than in
1998.176  Additionally, agencies are denying more requests than ever, and the
number of individuals receiving the information they requested fell by 31%.177
As a result of the lackluster response to FOIA requests, Senators Patrick
Leahy and John Cornyn introduced the Open Government Act of 2007 in an
attempt to plug some of the procedural holes in FOIA.178  The bill was quickly
approved by Congress and signed into law as Public Law No. 110-175.179 The
bill’s passage reflects a growing discontent with the difficulty of the public in
receiving responses to their FOIA requests and the frequent rejection of valid
requests.  President Bush signed the bill toughening FOIA, making it the first
attempt aimed at strengthening public access in over a decade.180  Thus, the
Trentadue decision, with its pro-disclosure slant, also reflects a trend back
towards the original purpose of the FOIA. 
B. The Trentadue Court Returns to the Heart of the Freedom of Information
Act
The Tenth Circuit took an important step towards a policy of disclosure and
transparent government.  Through a series of poorly reasoned decisions, courts
had chipped away at Exemption Five until even summaries of facts proved to
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be exempt.181  Such an interpretation of Exemption Five would exclude nearly
all information that an individual might seek so long as it is peripherally
related to a deliberative process.  The Trentadue court outright rejected such
a broad interpretation and appropriately used the Mink fact or opinion test,
allowing for a very narrow exception that would allow some factual
information to be withheld only if it dangerously exposed the deliberative
process.182  Even Judge Pregerson, who drafted a concurring opinion in
National Wildlife Federation notes that, “[u]nder the majority’s so-called
‘functional’ test, FOIA is swallowed up by exemption 5, a result contrary to
the plain purpose of the Act.”183 By rejecting the functional test, the Tenth
Circuit remains true to the purpose of FOIA.
The Justice Department cites three main reasons for the deliberative process
privilege: to encourage frank discussion on matters of policies between
subordinates and superiors, to protect agencies from premature disclosure of
policy, and “to protect against public confusion that might result from
disclosure of reasons and rationales that were not in fact ultimately the grounds
for an agency’s action.”184  The Ninth Circuit’s functional test widely
overestimates the chilling effect that certain information would have upon
governmental agencies.  The Tenth Circuit has found the appropriate
measuring stick for determining whether information reveals the deliberative
process privilege—when the information would “so expose the deliberative
process within an agency that it must be deemed exempted.”185  Because the
Tenth Circuit’s rule appropriately values disclosure over non-disclosure, its
decision more accurately reflects Congress’ interest in the FOIA.  It is not
merely that information might expose some aspects of the deliberative process,
but that it would expose the deliberative process to a degree greater than the
need for government transparency. 
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Even more important to a fair administration of the FOIA than the Tenth
Circuit’s rule is its application of the rule to the documents at hand.  The court
examined each document specifically and dissected each sentence in order to
disclose every piece of non-exempt information.186  Although the district court
examined the documents and found that every factual statement was
“inextricably intertwined” with the deliberative material, its response can only
be evidence of judicial inefficiency or a misunderstanding of “segregable.”187
In contrast, the Tenth Circuit found that non-exempt factual information could
easily be excised from the surrounding deliberative material.188 
For the Trentadue family, this newly-ordered disclosable information could
shed some light on the mysterious circumstances surrounding Kenneth’s death
and the alleged government cover-up that followed.  While courts could easily
examine documents in a vacuum, leading to much easier denials and less
desire to parcel out disclosable information, the importance of each piece of
information that can now be disclosed should not be underestimated.  Even
minor factual data could expose a conspiracy that stretches through several
governmental agencies.
C. The Supreme Court Needs to Provide Further Guidance to Lower Courts
The last time that the Supreme Court addressed Exemption Five of the
FOIA, it established the fact or opinion test in Mink.  Since that test emerged,
the circuit courts have split on whether or not to strictly apply the test or to
stretch the fact or opinion test to include facts that might have some bearing
on the deliberative process.  Without clearer guidance on how to interpret
Exemption Five’s deliberative process privilege, lower courts will continue to
adopt divergent views on how to decide whether a factual document reveals
the deliberative process and should be exempt.  The difference between the
Ninth Circuit’s functional test and the Tenth Circuit’s interpretation of the
Mink opinion will produce widely variable decisions regarding whether
information can be withheld as exempt.  Under the functional test, most of
Fine’s letter—which the Tenth Circuit ordered to be turned over—could be
withheld for exposing the deliberative process of the IC.  Even more confusion
lies within jurisdictions that do not yet have circuit court decisions to guide
them.  Individuals making FOIA requests will pay a high price for the
uncertainty among the circuits, including increased rejections, longer wait
times, increased litigation, and a wide disparity of decisions on similar cases.
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Additionally, increased litigation and appellate reviews will cause undue
delays in the procurement of documents.  Pending appeal, FOIA defendants
can seek injunctions allowing them to withhold documents they have been
ordered to overturn.  Appeals can be lengthy, leaving FOIA plaintiffs in limbo,
waiting for their information after winning in district court.  For instance, in
Trentadue, the IC similarly requested that it not be forced to overturn Fine’s
letter until certiorari had been granted or rejected by the Supreme Court.189
Jesse Trentadue did not end up receiving the documents that the Tenth Circuit
ordered to be handed over until seven months after the opinion had been filed.
VI. Conclusion
Democracy requires transparency in government.  True transparency, as
should be afforded by the FOIA, provides a check against possible corruption
and waste in the government.  While government officials can always be
counted on to tout their exploits and successes, mistakes and dishonesty can
often only be revealed through FOIA requests.  The Trentadue case
demonstrates the need to reveal government secrets to expose the possible
cover-up of a murder.
The Trentadue case returned to the ultimate goal of the FOIA: disclosure
and transparency with appropriate restraints.  Instead of embracing the
functional test put forth by the Ninth Circuit, the Tenth Circuit correctly
interpreted Exemption Five narrowly and required the IC to turn over
documents containing factual information.
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